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In a surprising revelation, a University of Michigan study published in July 2008 unearthed security-threatening design flaws in 76 percent of the 214 U.S. financial institution Websites they studied.
The research didn’t uncover vulnerabilities in the Websites themselves, which have been well monitored by industry auditors, nor did it find problems with the Websites’ coding that could allow criminals to break in. Instead, the main culprit was in design flaws that directed consumers on the banking Websites to third party Websites, sometimes without telling the consumers that they were being directed to Websites outside of the original banking Website, where they would not have the same level of security protection.
Here is how it happens:
Financial institutions silently redirect users to third-party Websites, plopping “secure login” boxes on insecure Web pages, and improperly using Social Security numbers or e-mail addresses - which an outsider can figure out - as default user names.
Even if the login boxes on financial institutions’ Web pages are properly secured - if the full page itself isn’t protected with the same technology, it’s more difficult to tell whether the site is real or fake.
Also, if users aren’t notified that they’re being taken to another Website (e.g., a financial institution uses a partner Website for online bill-paying), then it’s hard to determine if the new Website is trustworthy, because the online registration certificate carries a different company’s name.
The result is that even the most security-conscious consumers could find themselves the victims of identity theft because they’ve been conditioned to ignore potential clues about whether the financial Website they’re visiting is real - or a bogus Website set up by hackers.
“We want financial institutions to make the right decisions so people who are trying to be careful can do online banking securely,” said U of M’s lead researcher, Atul Prakash, a professor of computer science and engineering.